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TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE: DISCIPLINING
FACT DETERMINATION
by
Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon*
As a part of a larger project called "The Challenge of Change: Rethinking
Law as Discipline, " Professors Boyle and MacCrimmon seek "to identify
and examine current challenges to the conceptual underpinnings and meth-
odology of the traditional legal paradigm." In focusing on the construction
of "'fact, " the meanings of knowledge and the interplay between cultural
understandings and the law of evidence, the authors note that the shifting
boundaries of the discipline of law are engendering debates about what is
marginal and what is core. They draw on challenges posed by the increasing
diversity of producers and consumers of law in searching for the core idea of
what lawyers do in contrast to, for instance, anthropologists, and argue that
a core idea of law is to engage in legal reasoning that pays attention to the
value of human rights in their broadest sense. In examining methods whereby
the knowledge which grounds legal factual determinations can be made con-
sistent with fundamental human rights such as equality and access to justice,
the authors draw on a variety of legal topics-Aboriginal rights claims, sexual
assault, contracts and self-defence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The research for this paper was funded by a grant devoted to a larger
project entitled "The Challenge of Change: Rethinking Law as Disci-
pline," ' based at the Faculty of Law of the University of British Columbia.
This project "seeks to identify and examine current challenges to the con-
ceptual underpinnings and methodology of the traditional legal paradigm
characterized by a belief in the autonomy, neutrality and objectivity of
law." 2 The focus of this paper is, therefore, on that theme as it applies to the
law of evidence and the process of fact determination. What are the chal-
lenges to the conceptual underpinnings and methodology of law in this
context? What should "discipline" legal reasoning about fact determination
and, in turn, the process of fact determination in itself?
We are here using the concept of discipline to mean a sort of method-
ological superstructure which shows what law is, in contrast both to other
academic disciplines and to reasoning, such as intuition, unstructured by
rules or assumptions about validity. Disciplines involve shared ways of
thinking and talking. Disciplines define some questions as interesting and
relevant, some as tedious, tangential or a waste of time. They define which
rule must be strictly followed and which permits the exercise of discretion.
* Professors, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia.
I The authors wish to express their thanks to the University of British Columbia Hampton
Fund for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences as well as to Lisa Gill, Monique
Pongracic-Speier and Bennett Wong.
2 Hampton Fund for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences Grant Proposal, "The
Challenge of Change: Rethinking Law as Discipline" principal investigators Marilyn
MacCrimmon and Ruth Buchanan.
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Disciplines have their own methods of framing and solving problems, what
J.R. Balkin refers to as "tools of understanding"; "[the] world begins to
resemble and seems to be organized around the intellectual tools that lay to
hand. As the saying goes, when all that you have is a hammer, everything
starts to look like a nail."'3 An example of a law "hammer" could be framed
as "look to the past." Another could be framed as "pay attention to hierar-
chy" (for instance in terms of legislation over case law, or appeal over trial
courts). For Balkin:
Academic disciplines ... are about authority, and in particular, about authority
within particular groups of persons who think alike through training and dis-
cipline.
4
He defends this concept against the charge that it is authoritarian:
At first glance, this might seem a rather authoritarian vision of disciplines
and disciplinarity, a sort of academic bondage ... But quite the opposite is the
case. For the authority of discipline is not the enemy of reason. It is its foun-
tainhead. A discipline organizes and empowers thought. It makes having cer-
tain kinds of thoughts possible. Disciplines create forms of reasoning by the
very organization they impose on the mind. Disciplined thought is organized
thought, and the flip side of its organization is a necessary degree of structur-
ing and preconception. It could not be otherwise, for an undisciplined mind
would be unable to proceed very far.
5
It makes sense to assume that students will be most conscious of the
methods of a new discipline when they are first exposed to it, such as in the
first year of legal education. A description of the discipline of law in that
context, and which still may resonate for many, can be found in the work of
Karl Llewellyn:
The first year ... aims to drill into you the more essential techniques of han-
dling cases ... . The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common-
sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of social
policy, your sense of justice-to knock these out of you along with woozy
thinking, along with ideas all fuzzed along their edges. You are to acquire
ability to think precisely, to analyze coldly, to work within a body of materi-
als that is given, to see, and see only, and manipulate, the machinery of the
law.
6
3 J.M. Balkin, "Interdisciplinarity as Colonization" (1996) 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 949 at
955.
4 Ibid. at 954.
5 Ibid. at 955. This is an interesting comment in this context, since we will argue below that
fact finding is relatively undisciplined and yet fact finders routinely proceed to complete
their fact finding jobs.
6 K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and its Study (New York: Oceana Publi-
cations, 1951) at 101, quoted in P. Schlag, "Clerks in the Maze" (1993) 91 Mich. Law Rev.
2053 at 2058, n. 8.
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This may suggest a monolithic view of what the discipline of law
requires. But disciplines also frame their own debates about what counts as
knowledge legitimately created on their terms-what is good rather than
"junk" science, what counts as valid anthropological method, what is
"legal" reasoning, and so on. For instance, anthropologists identify two
types of knowledge---emic and etic:
Emic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms
of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful and appro-
priate by the native members of the culture whose belief and behaviors are
being studied. Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions and analyses
expressed in terms of conceptual schemes and categories regarded as mean-
ingful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers.
7
Such debates are echoed within the discipline of law. Differing views
about anthropological methods have relevance to and are reflected in judi-
cial attempts to evaluate oral history evidence offered to prove Aboriginal
rights. Thus anthropologists distinguish folk history from ethnohistory:
[T]he aim of ethnohistory is to explain what happened in terms that make
sense to us ... . [T]he contrast in folk history is that one attempts to find out
how members of society explain why things happened the way they did.
Thus the methodology of ethnohistory is essentially 'etic,' while the method-
ology of folk history is essentially 'emic.'8
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, a leading case on Aboriginal land
claims and the law of evidence in relation to such claims, the First Nations
claiming Aboriginal title introduced oral history evidence of their social
structure, customs, laws and attachment to the land.9 The trial judge
rejected the oral histories "because they were not 'literally true', con-
founded 'what is fact and what is belief,' included some material which
might be classified as 'mythology,' and projected a 'romantic view' of the
7 J. Lett, Science, Reason and Anthropology: The Principles of Rational Inquiry (Oxford:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) at 8. R. Feeppa, "Emics, Etics, and Social Objectivity"
(1986) 27 Curr. Anthropology 243 at 243: "[Slome view emics and etics as innately con-
flicting; ... some minimize or ignore emic analysis in the belief that it inhibits the devel-
opment of a systematic culture theory, while others willingly sacrifice theory for emic
understanding of the culturally specific." The emic/etic distinction is also employed in
history. See D.K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?" (1993) 50 William & Mary Q. 379 at
387. Despite this debate, recognition that one cannot view another culture except through
one's own cultural filters has lead members of both schools to be self-conscious about
who is speaking for whom and who should speak for whom. See L.A. Kuznar, Reclaim-
ing a Scientific Anthropology (Walnut Creek, C.A: Altamira Press, 1997) at 138 & 148-
49.
8 A. von Gernet, "Oral Narratives and Aboriginal Pasts: An Interdisciplinary Review of the
Literature on Oral Traditions and Oral Histories" in Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development, Oral Tradition-Part 2, Vol. One (Ottawa: Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development, 1996) 21 at 41 quoting C.M. Hudson, "Folk History
and Ethnohistory" (1966) 13 Ethnohistory 52 at 53-54.
9 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193.
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history of the appellants." 10 In a sense the trial judge's method of analysing
of oral history in Delgamuukw could be said to resemble an ethnohistorical
approach in that he interpreted the oral histories "in terms that made sense
to him"'" while the Supreme Court of Canada's holding that oral history
must be given independent weight requires legal decision makers to take
into account how Aboriginal peoples "order their historical experiences"
and "to recognize [Aboriginal peoples] for who they are."'
12
Indeed the debate in law goes deeper in that not only do judges hearing
oral history have to take a position on how to value or weigh it, but where
they hear evidence from experts such as anthropologists or historians, in a
sense they are called upon to judge the very methods of other disciplines.
For instance, the trial judge in Delgamuukw assigned little weight to the
evidence of anthropologists whose studies were based on the method of
participant observation, although this is an accepted method in anthropo-
logical study.13 In his view, the close association between the First Nations
and the anthropologists evidenced a bias in favour of First Nations.' 4 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to revisit the trial judge's
rejection of the evidence holding that "findings of credibility, including the
credibility of expert witnesses, are for the trial judge to make, and should
warrant considerable deference from appellate courts."' 5 Similarly, in R. v.
Marshall, the Supreme Court acknowledged criticism from "professional
10 Ibid. at para. 97. The trial decision in Detgamuukw was the subject of extensive commen-
tary. Many commentators criticized the judgment as failing to take the perspective of
Aboriginal peoples into account and in particular for giving no weight to the oral history
evidence. See e.g., J. Cruikshank, "Invention of Anthropology in British Columbia's
Supreme Court: Oral Tradition as Evidence in Delgamuukw v. B.C." (1992) 95 B.C. Stud.
at 25; D. Culhane, The Pleasure of the Crown: Anthropology, Law and First Nations
(Bumaby: Talon Books, 1997); A. Mills, Eagle Down is our Law: Witsuwit'en Law,
Feasts, and Land Claims (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997). For a
legal perspective see G. Sherrott, "The Court's Treatment of the Evidence in Delgamuukw
v. B.C." (1992) 56 Sask. L. Rev. 441. In contrast Alexander von Gemet concluded that the
historical interpretations of the trial judge while "problematic, [were] not at all uncommon
in the academic world, ..." von Gemet, supra note 8 at 21.
11 See e.g., Mills, ibid. at 28-29 (contrasts the trial judge's interpretation of a trader's report
that natives were naked as meaning the natives wore no clothes with an interpretation
based on the culture of traders in the 1820's with its beliefs about what constituted proper
dress, which would view someone in a loin cloth or skirts as naked).
12 J.R. Fortune, "Construing Delgamuukw: Legal Arguments, Historical Argumentation and
the Philosophy of History" (1993)51 U.T Fac. L. Rev. 80 at 116-117.
13 An edited version of the factum of the Gitksan Hereditary Chiefs in the British Columbia
Court of Appeal addressing the question of the weight to be assigned to the expert anthro-
pologists is reproduced in C. Boyle, M.T. MacCrimmon & D. Martin, The Law of Evi-
dence: Fact Finding, Fairness and Advocacy (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1999) at 674.
14 Delgamuukw v. B.C. (1991), 79 O.L.R. (4th) 185 at 248-51 (B.C.S.C.). The trial judge
partly based his dismissal of the expert evidence on the Statement of Ethics of the Ameri-
can Anthropological Association which states that "[AIn anthropologist's paramount
responsibility is to those he studies." See M. Asch, "Errors in Delgamuukw: An Anthropo-
logical Perspective" in F. Cassidy, Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delagmuukw v.
R. (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1992) 221 at 237, (responds to the criticism that
anthropologists were biased due to their ethical commitment to give paramount responsi-
bility to those he or she studies on the basis it is taken out of the context of an ethical code
that is designed to ensure "rigour and comparability of results").
15 Supra note 9 at para. 91.
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historians for what these historians see as an occasional tendency on the
part of judges to assemble a 'cut and paste' version of history."' 6 The
Court's response was that, while the historical method requires that histori-
ans be open to revising their views in the light of new evidence and that in
the discipline of history "finality ... is not possible":
[t]he reality ... is that the courts are handed disputes that require for their res-
olution the finding of certain historical facts. The litigating parties cannot
await the possibility of a stable academic consensus. The judicial process
must do as best it can.'
7
Disciplines can of course tolerate, and indeed thrive on, internal debates
about method. However, at one end of the spectrum of such debates are the
most dramatic challenges to any discipline. Such challenges can arise when
there is serious lack of consensus about the very existence of a set of
boundary-setting, methodological and legitimacy creating rules. In our
view, it is the case today that law faces such a dramatic challenge. Increas-
ingly diverse bodies of legal knowledge producers, users and consumers
(as well as learners) are generating "... diverse notions about what is most
worth teaching, studying and discussing" 18 so that concepts of both what is
marginal and core are contested. Indeed, what counts as legal knowledge or
legal analysis at all is a matter of debate.
In this paper, we argue that this diversity-fuelled challenge, in itself, can
be used as a source of a core idea of what it is that lawyers do, in academic
distinction to, say, anthropologists or historians, or, in institutional distinc-
tion, to a society lacking an independent judiciary or bar, or even a segment
of the public trained to think in terms of fundamental human values. We
say that to engage in legal reasoning is to be attentive to human rights, in
the broadest sense-that legally-trained people, that is those who under-
stand and are committed to the concept of the rule of law, reflect the invest-
ment society makes in insurance against tyranny and injustice. This can be
expressed in terms, familiar to lawyers, of professional responsibility. For
example, the Law Society of British Columbia, in its Canons of Legal Eth-
ics, says that "it is a lawyer's duty ... to serve the cause of justice."' 9 We
take the view that the discipline of law requires attention to the very values,
in particular such values as human dignity and equality, which form the
basis of the criticism that individual laws or legal practices fail to live up to
those values. In that the very essence of lawyering requires attention to
such values it can be said that people who are not so attentive are doing
something that is perhaps legalistic but not law.
16 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456.
17 Ibid. at para. 38.
18 J.M. Balkin & S. Levinson, "Commentary: The Canons of Constitutional Law" (1998) 111
Harv. L. Rev. 963 at 997.
19 See Law Society of British Columbia, Professional Conduct Handbook: Canons of Legal
Ethics (Vancouver: Law Society of British Colunbia, 1992), online: The Law Society of
British Columbia <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca> (last modified: 5 May 2000).
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The work of Richard Weisberg on lawyers in Vichy, France provides an
illustration:
2 0
For several years I have been examining the way in which lawyers spoke
during the stressful period of French history known as "Vichy" (1940-1944).
Here I will present a variety of empirical data and make a disturbing claim
arising from that data: that a loose system of institutionally acceptable pro-
fessional rhetoric [including about the admissibility of evidence] caused (as
much as did the terror or influence of German occupation) the definition,
identification, and eventual destruction of tens of thousands of Jews-for
the majority (but not the entirety) of such legal rhetoric was unchecked by
any interpretative model that would have permitted recourse to certain foun-
dational beliefs [such as inequality] to evaluate and constrain itself.
21
An example closer to home could be a lawyer acting for the Crown ask-
ing, "How can I use the technical tools of law to avoid my client's obliga-
tion to act honourably toward Aboriginal peoples" rather than "How can I
advise my client to act honourably toward Aboriginal peoples" or "How
are my ethical obligations as a lawyer affected by my client's obligation to
act honourably towards another party in litigation." We realize there is a
fine line here, between legitimate debate about what the honour of the
Crown requires and a process of reasoning which permits neglect of that
obligation but, in our view, there is a line there which sets a fundamental
boundary on the discipline of law.
22
In other words, we are not of the view that "to be a lawyer is to vacate
the ordinary domain of ethical judgement and to inhabit a perverse world
of normative disingenuity" or that "the hallmark of good lawyers is ... their
cultivation of rule-craft." Rather, we agree with Allan Hutchinson that,
instead of "passive and technical involvement," "[c]hoice and responsibil-
ity for those choices, are part and parcel of lawyering."
2 3
In particular, and in tune with our published work to date (one of us in
the field of evidence law and one in the field of criminal law), we see atten-
tion to the fundamental value of equality as at the core of what it means to
analyse issues within the discipline of law. It is with a sense of lawyers as
the guardians of equality that we turn to the law of evidence to examine its
responses to claims of disadvantage in the fact-finding process.
The law of evidence is a useful vehicle for considering this core element
20 R.H. Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies of Law & Literature (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992) at 143-187.
21 Ibid. at 144.
22 The focus of this paper is not on an analysis of that boundary, and indeed it may be enough
for our purposes to say that the more attentive legal analysis is to fundamental values the
more disciplined and law-like it is.
23 See A.C. Hutchinson, "Calgary and Everything After: A Postmodern Re-vision of Law-
yering" (1995) 33 Alberta L. Rev. 768 at 772. On the concept of transcendental justice see
J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998).
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of lawness. 24 It is becoming more law-like in its increasing focus on basic
principles in terms of doctrine and its increasing regulation of the anarchic
process of fact finding. In assessing such developments from a standpoint
of considering whether they make law more or less disciplined in its focus
on such a fundamental value, we draw on examples from a variety of top-
ics-Aboriginal rights claims, sexual assault, contracts and self-defence.
Having approached this examination through a sense of the discipline of
law as a superstructure, we turn to evidence rules as a second-level meth-
odology or set of "tools of understanding" 25 for determining knowledge-
they filter the information that can be considered by the decision maker,
determine its form and, to a limited extent, regulate its use. 26 Studying
them may provide some sense of the core of lawness, attention to funda-
mental values such as equality, that we suggest above.
[E]videntiary rules reflect epistemological assumptions .... They identify
valid data, specify how the data should be presented, and guide our evalua-
tion ... . The rules of evidence specify who can be a source of knowledge
(rules of witness competency), the test to identify which beliefs qualify as
knowledge (exclusionary rules, burdens of proof), what kinds of things can
be known (subjective beliefs are knowledge), methods of verification (rules
on credibility and corroboration), etc.27
Our consideration of the law of evidence takes place in a particular con-
text. There are certain obvious elements that are challenging the law of evi-
dence to change at the turn of the century. They are all interconnected as
well as connected to access to justice: the increasing diversity of producers
and consumers of law mentioned above, the increasing interdisciplinarity,
both in the academy and in the profession, the increasing muscularity of
constitutional rights such as equality, the increasing scholarly and judicial
attention to (as well as appellate control over) common sense reasoning in
fact determination and the shrinking role of the paradigm of the criminal
trial by jury in a world with many different institutional contexts in which
facts have to be determined.28
Precisely because, on an ideal level at least, lawyers are disciplined to be
attentive to fundamental values, the evidentiary "tools of understanding"
are changing to meet the challenges of a recognizably diverse society. One
consequence of these challenges is increased attention to the process of fact
determination and in particular to the question: Whose social knowledge or
24 Thanks to Victoria Gray for her reaction to "'lawness" as a Joycean word for the essense of
law. See "Horseness is the whatness of allhorse." James Joyce, Ulysses, Lestrygonians
quoted at: http://www.concordance.com/joyce.htm (select Ulysses and on the next page
enter "horseness").
25 Balkin, ibid. at c. 1.
26 M.T. MacCrimmon, "Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1989-90 Term Evidence
in Context" (1991) 2 Supreme Court L.R. (2d) 385.
27 Ibid. at 388.
28 For example, the current interest in the use of mediation and the increasing use of interna-
tional and transnational bodies such as international criminal courts.
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world views will ground findings of fact? The criticality of this question is
highlighted when the law adjudicates disputes between different cultures as
in Aboriginal cases. The debate about social knowledge, however, is not so
limited, but is central whenever persons with differing world views are
seeking "justice." Research on the process of fact determination in law
shows that those groups whose world view ground factual determinations
are the beneficiaries, according to Andrew Taslitz, of "... social resources,
like physical freedom, money and other kinds of power ... often at another
group's expense."
29
In other words, law as a discipline affects the rules which, in turn, disci-
plines the process of fact determination. Lawyers are becoming more self-
conscious about this process, the ways that the law of evidence affects that
process and that "our knowledge about 'truth' is conditioned by the culture
to which we belong and our historical circumstances ... "30 In some
instances, the law is becoming more open to stories of oppression and doc-
trine is emerging to facilitate the incorporation of those stories into fact
determination. It can no longer simply be asserted that "facts are facts."
Facts are constructed and the law is beginning to discipline that construc-
tion to be egalitarian.
Against this background, we discuss some of the ways law disciplines
fact determinations. How does law maintain uniform interpretive practices?
What is the role of other disciplines in these challenges? We will examine
three aspects of interpretive practices in legal factual determination:
1. The distinction between law and fact. When is an issue the subject of fac-
tual determination rather than substantive legal reasoning?
2. Pathways to social context. When can a fact finder examine the factual
background or context of an issue, in particular evidence of social disad-
vantage in that context?
3. The control of relevance reasoning. When is common sense reasoning
subject to regulation?
11. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LAW AND FACT
The classification between law and fact has been fundamental to the
evolution of the law governing the processes of fact determination. On a
most basic level, a judge decides legal questions and a jury decides factual
questions. The resolution of legal questions is governed by conventions of
legal reasoning, while the resolution of factual questions is relatively
unregulated. Adrian Zuckerman describes the traditional view of the dis-
tinction between legal and factual reasoning as follows:
... [Liegal reasoning [proceeds] according to normative rules laid down by
the lawmaker or by morality ... . By contrast, in factual reasoning, it is sup-
29 A. Taslitz, "Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance" (1998) 49
Hastings U. 1039 at 1059.
30 Supra note 26 at 385.
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posed, we are not concerned with what the rules of law or morality require
but with what facts exist. To ascertain the facts, it is said, we only have to
follow the forms of reasoning which are employed for this purpose in any
form of factual inquiry.:I
The decision whether to classify a matter as law or fact is, to a great
extent, unregulated, falling between the stools of substantive and eviden-
tiary analyses. While the allocation may be random or driven by social or
political forces, it is possible to find some clues to what disciplines that
allocation. Closest to the surface may be. institutional concerns about the
appropriate decision-maker, concerns most easily expressed in traditional
terms as lack of confidence in juries. For instance, is the interpretation of
contracts a matter of law or fact? Little attention has been paid to this issue,
but the dominant view seems to be that interpretation of written contracts is
a matter of law, while interpretation of oral contracts is a matter of fact.
32
This distinction may be grounded in a fear that juries would not be able to
recognize the trustworthiness of a written document, a concern not present
with respect to oral agreements.
There is increasing awareness, however, that the choice may affect fun-
damental values such as equality and access to justice. Whether a matter is
classified as law or fact has consequences, for instance, for the burden of
proof in terms of who benefits from the status quo. The choice is not a sim-
ple one, but requires analysis of the consequences to those affected. In
some instances, classifying an issue as factual will be more disciplined if it
reflects a commitment to fundamental values. For example, seeing an issue
as factual may reflect equality in the form of valuing diversity in being
open to different outcomes. In other situations, classification as law is the
more "disciplined" choice. For instance, classification of an issue as a mat-
ter of law may be seen to be more disciplined in that there is less opportu-
nity for the operation of inegalitarian social knowledge.
The law of sexual assault provides a very clear example of both the
importance of the classification of an issue as legal or factual and the shift-
31 A.S. Zuckerman, "Law, Fact or Justice" (1986) 66 Boston U. L. Rev. 487 at 487.
32 See e.g., J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Volume 9, rev. by J.H. Chad-
bourn, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1981) at 684: "[t]he construction of all writ-
ten instruments belongs to the court" (emphasis in original); Sir Christopher Staughton,
"How Do the Courts Interpret Commercial Contracts?" (1999) 58 Cambridge L. 303, the
"meaning of a written contract is a question of law for the judge, and not a question of fact
for the jury; the opposite rule applies to an oral contract. That is strange law. But as con-
tract disputes are never now tried by a judge and jury, I leave the reader to ponder.. over
the logic of saying that the meaning of a contract is a matter of law." See K. Lewison, The
Interpretation of Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) at 52: "The proper con-
struction of a contract is a question of law. However, the ascertainment of the meaning of
a particular word is a question of fact." See also K.A. Rowley, "Contract Construction and
Interpretation: From the "Four Comers" to Parol Evidence (And Everything in Between)"
(1999) 69 Miss. L. 73 at 91: "[l]f a contract is clear and unambiguous, its meaning and
effect are matters of law which may be determined by the court, and which should be
enforced as written" and R. Braucher, "Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second
Restatement of Contracts'" (1981) 81 Colum. L.R. 13 at 16: "[i]nterpretation is directed to
the meaning of the terms of the writing, not to the meaning of the conversations of the par-
ties, and it is treated as a matter of law unless it depends on extrinsic facts."
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ing nature of this classification. The meaning of consent to sexual contact
has been contested for some time, including on the level of whether its con-
tent is primarily factual or legal. A familiar example is the question of
whether a woman who says no may nevertheless be consenting.33 If this
issue is approached as a factual one then it is possible for a judge or jury to
decide that "no can mean maybe" 34 or, presumably, yes. If it is approached
as a legal issue, then it is open to the law, on a normative level, to take the
position that "no means no" and that, therefore, a complainant who said no
has not consented as a matter of law. Indeed, for some time it looked as if
this normative determination of when it is legal to touch someone sexually
had been achieved by Parliament in its most recent reforms of the law of
sexual assault (commonly known as Bill C-49), specifically s.273.1(2)(d)
of the Criminal Code,35 which states that no consent is obtained ... where
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to
engage in the activity [sometimes called the "no means no" provision].
The contrast between analysing the meaning of no as a factual or a legal
issue, as well as the implications for the status of women, can be illustrated
by reference to the majority and dissenting judgments at the Alberta Court
of Appeal level in R. v. Ewanchuk 36 This was a sexual assault case in
which the significant facts, for the purpose of this discussion, were that the
complainant said no to the accused several times. He would then stop and
then start touching her again. Nevertheless, the accused was acquitted at
trial on the basis of implied consent. The Crown appealed unsuccessfully to
the Court of Appeal but successfully to the Supreme Court of Canada. At
the Court of Appeal, the majority saw the issue as one of fact and that it
was being invited to overturn findings of fact for which there was eviden-
tiary support.37 Fraser C.J.A., in dissent, saw the issue as involving a mis-
understanding by the trial judge of the legal meaning of consent under
s.273.1(1) of the Criminal Code. Her analysis was grounded in the relevant
statutory provisions as opposed to a factual analysis of the significance of
the complainant's "nos.,,
In this context, the classification of the issue as a legal one (albeit with a
need for factual determinations such as whether the complainant actually
said no) has significant advantages for women, the primary targets for sex-
ual assault. The legal definition controls the operation of social knowledge
by minimizing the possibility of discriminatory assumptions about the sex-
ual accessibility and mendaciousness of women (such as willing women
pretending to be unwilling). Thus, the shift from fact to law is an attempt to
33 Of course, whether or not she said no is uncontroversially a question of fact.
34 See e.g., R. v. Letendre (1991), 5 C.R. (4 ) 159 (B.C.S.C.).
35 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s. 273.1(2)(d), [hereinafter Criminal Code].
36 R. v. Ewanchuk (1998), 13 C.R. (5' h) 324 (Alta. C.A.).
37 Ibid. at 337. The case became somewhat notorious for McClung J.A.'s factual character-
izations of the complainant, for instance, that she did not present herself "in a bonnet and
crinolines."
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regulate social knowledge by eliminating "archaic myths and stereotypes
about the nature of sexual assaults _.".38 Legal rulings become more
appealable. As well, the understanding that the concept of consent is con-
trolled by law, not individual assumptions about human behaviour, leads to
the understanding that mistakes as to consent can be mistakes of law. If "no
means no" as a matter of law, it is a mistake of law for an accused to
believe that when the complainant said "no" that she did not mean "non-
consent" because she said no with a smile.
39
Proponents of increased legal control of the meaning of consent were
well aware of such advantages as they pressed for reform of sexual assault
law. For example, in her discussion of the consultations leading up to the
enactment of Bill C-49, Sheila McIntyre refers to the awareness of the need
"to reform the substantive law that allows male-centered stereotypes and
myths about women and women's sexuality to define the criminality of
male violence."
40
Interestingly, the shift from fact to law has not been stable, since the
Supreme Court of Canada developed a new analysis of sexual assault in R.
v. Ewanchuk.4 There are a number of very positive elements to Ewanchuk.
The decision maintains the recognition that the meaning of consent is fun-
damentally a matter of law, and thus reviewable by appeal courts. It recog-
nizes that some mistakes, for instance that silence constitutes consent, are
mistakes of law and thus no defence. However, the case also restores a sig-
nificant element of fact-based analysis to the concept of consent, given that
the test for whether the complainant consented is a subjective one about her
state of mind and "a matter of credibility to be weighed in light of all the
evidence including any ambiguous conduct." 42 Thus, while the case says
there is no implied consent in law, a trial judge could reach what is, in
effect, an implied consent conclusion as a matter of fact. Thus, "you say
you did not consent, but given your behaviour I have a doubt about whether
to believe your testimony about your state of mind."
So it is difficult to be sure about whether Ewanchuk is positive or nega-
tive, in terms of the fact/law distinction, with respect to its implications for
sex equality. The Court treats s.273.1 of the Criminal Code (which includes
some of the more recent reforms such as the "no means no" provision) as
relating to mistaken belief in consent rather than consent. Since the "no
means no" rule does not control the legal meaning of consent, it is possible
that a judge could, as suggested above, find the complainant's assertion
that "no" reflected her non-consenting state of mind to be lacking in credi-
bility. This would undermine feminist arguments that "no" means non-con-
38 Per L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in R. v. Ewanchuk (1999), 22 C.R. (51h) 1 (S.C.C.) at para. 95.
39 See e.g., ibid. at para. 51 where Major J., speaking for the majority, said that "a belief that
silence, passivity or ambiguous conduct constitutes consent is a mistake of law, and pro-
vides no defence."
40 S. McIntyre, "Redefining Reformism: The Consultations That Shaped Bill C-49" in J.V.
Roberts & R.M. Mohr, eds., Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social
Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 293 at 296.
41 Supra note 38.
42 Supra note 38 at para. 17-18.
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sent as a matter of law. However, this may not be of practical significance
given the strong statements that mistakes as to "no" meaning "yes" are
mistakes of law. Nevertheless, at the moment, Ewanchuk seems to leave
open the odd scenario that the Crown might not be able to prove non-con-
sent, but could disprove mistaken belief in consent.
We wonder if the Supreme Court of Canada considered the implications
of stressing the "fact" content of the concept of consent, and would prefer
to see more disciplined, in the sense of conscious, attention paid to the
implications of any shift in fact/law classifications.
The Supreme of Canada's decision in Delgamuukw v. B.C., referred to
above, is an instance in which the consequences of law/fact classification
were only partially addressed. In Delgamuukw, the Court held that Aborig-
inal rights depend on factual questions about pre-contact practices of the
Aboriginal peoples and placed the burden on them to establish these facts
in each case.43 The process whereby Aboriginal rights are made questions
of fact is not set out or analyzed by the Court. However, the Court did rec-
ognize that the factual test would be an almost impossible one to satisfy
unless oral history evidence of Aboriginal peoples was put on "an equal
footing with the types of historical evidence that courts are familiar with,
which largely consists of historical documents." 44 Lamer C.J. quoted Van
der Peet at para 68:
In determining whether an Aboriginal claimant has produced evidence suffi-
cient to demonstrate that her activity is an aspect of a practice, custom or tra-
dition integral to a distinctive Aboriginal culture, a court should approach the
rules of evidence, and interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness
of the special nature of Aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties
in proving a right which originates in times where there were no written
records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in.
45
The Court held that the laws of evidence must be adapted:
"so that the Aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and traditions
and on their relationship with the land, are given due weight by the courts. In
practical terms, this requires the courts to come to terms with the oral histo-
ries of Aboriginal societies, which, for many Aboriginal nations, are the only
record of their past."
46
43 For instance, the test for Aboriginal rights requires that Aboriginals demonstrate "a conti-
nuity between current Aboriginal activities and the pre-contact practices, customs and tra-
ditions of [A]boriginal societies," supra note 9 at para 83.
44 Supra note 9 at para. 87. Given that many Aboriginal societies did not keep written
records at the time of contact or sovereignty, it would be exceedingly difficult for them to
produce "conclusive evidence from pre-contact times about the practices, customs and tra-
ditions of their community" (R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. at para. 62). To quote
Dickson C.J. in Simon v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at 408: "given that most Aboriginal soci-
eties 'did not keep written records,' the failure to do so would 'impose an impossible bur-
den of proof' on Aboriginal peoples, and 'render nugatory' any rights that they have."
45 Supra note 9 at para. 80.
46 Supra note 9 at para 84.
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Placing oral history evidence on an equal footing with written historical
evidence increases the possibility that the law will decide the meaning of
Aboriginal rights within the context of their culture's history.
47
While Delgamuukw goes some way toward incorporating Aboriginal
perspectives into the legal decision making process, the Court's failure to
consider fully the consequences of its decision to make the existence of
Aboriginal rights largely factual questions about pre-contact or pre-sover-
eign laws, occupation and customs and the continuation of these activities
into the present has left both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples flounder-
ing in the factual arena. For instance, subsequent to the decision in Delga-
muukw, the Crown, in some cases, has taken the position that since the
existence of Aboriginal rights depends on facts that must be established in
each case, the Crown has no obligation to take these rights into account
until these facts are proven.48 This choice by the Crown has sparked a
debate about whether legal rules which place the burden on First Nations to
establish their rights in costly and lengthy trials are consistent with the
honour and fiduciary obligations of the Crown towards Aboriginal peoples.
Characterizing issues as factual and complex then placing the burden on
Aboriginal peoples to establish these facts has affected their access to justice
in several ways. For instance, applications by First Nations to have their
rights determined by way of summary trial have, in recent cases, been unsuc-
cessful.49 As a result Aboriginal peoples must incur the time and expense of
a full trial in order to establish their rights. The Secwepemc Band and the
Okanagan Indian Band have argued, in response to the Crown's argument
that a full trial is necessary, that the combination of the Bands' poverty and
the cost of a trial means that the Bands will not have "effective access to jus-
tice as a means of defending themselves and vindicating their constitutional
rights.",50 Therefore, the Bands argue if the Court orders a full trial, it must
require the Province to pay the Bands' costs for that trial.
On applications for injunctive relief, characterization of issues as com-
plex factual questions has affected whether courts consider the merits of
the case. Courts are less likely to do so if issues are seen as complex and
therefore even strong evidence of title may be given little weight. 5' View-
47 Fortune, supra note 13 at 117: "In order for law to respond to the needs of a different cul-
ture, it must create a forum for that culture's history to be told."
48 See e.g., Kelly Lake Cree Nation v. Canada (Minister of Energy and Mines), [ 1998] B.C.J.
No. 2471 (B.C.S.C.) at para 29: "The position of the Crown is that the duty to consult
arises only in respect of Aboriginal or treaty rights that have been established either
through determination by the courts or by the acknowledgment of the Crown as to their
existence."
49 See e.g., British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Westbank First Nation, [19991 B.C.J.
No. 2546 (B.C. S.C.) per Sigurdson J.
50 Described in L. Mandell, "Logging Cases" in Litigating Aboriginal Title (Vancouver: The
Continuing Legal Education Society of B.C., 2000) 1.1. See H.M.T.Q. v. ChiefRonnie
Jules et al. (the "Adams Lake Petition") (20 March 2000), Vernon, 23911 (B.C.S.C.) and
B.C. (Minister of Forests) v. Chief Dan Wilson et al. (the "Okanagan Petition") (25 July
2000), Vernon 23911 (B.C.S.C.), decision reserved.
51 R.M. Mogerman, "Advancing Title Directly in Court" in Litigating Aboriginal Title, ibid.
at 1.2.07, argues that courts should take strong evidence of Aboriginal title into account
when the issues involve constitutional rights relying on RJR- MacDonald Inc. v. Canada
Vol. 20
Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice
ing Aboriginal rights as complex factual questions has also resulted in
more weight being given to preserving the status quo on applications for an
injunction based on the reasoning that since complex, factual issues will
take a long time to resolve, those who currently benefit from the law will
suffer high costs if an injunction is issued.52 The effect has been to shift the
balance in favour of the Crown. In order to preserve the status quo, the
Crown has been granted applications to prevent First Nations from exercis-
ing asserted Aboriginal rights53 and applications by First Nations to enjoin
the Crown from infringing Aboriginal rights have been denied. 54 These
decisions may give too little weight to the interests of First Nations when
the status quo is an existing legal regime that gives no recognition to
Aboriginal rights and benefits non-Aboriginal third parties.
Case law and commentary on Aboriginal rights reflects a growing con-
sciousness that the seemingly neutral classification of an issue as factual is
inconsistent with a perspective which is explicitly attentive to public values
such as those in the Charter. For instance, case law and commentators sug-
gest that the Crown has a fiduciary duty to consult in respect of asserted
Aboriginal title. Such consultation can have the effect of converting factual
questions about Aboriginal rights and title to matters of law. Thus, Sonia
Lawrence and Patrick Macklein argue that Delgamuukw imposes a duty on
the Crown to consult prior to taking an action that might infringe an
Aboriginal right and that this would "require the Crown to make good faith
efforts to first jointly define the nature and scope of Aboriginal or treaty
rights before it seeks to determine the extent to which its proposed actions
might infringe such rights. ' 55 The duty would "operate to minimize reli-
ance on litigation as a means of determining the nature and scope of
Aboriginal and treaty rights" 56 and would "create incentives on the parties
to determine their respective rights without resorting to litigation."
57
(A.-G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter RJR-MacDonald]: "By calling the issues of
Aboriginal title 'complex' [and factual] the court makes the strong evidence of title and
the complete lack of accommodation irrelevant in deciding whether or not to issue an
interlocutory injunction. In this way the constitutional rights of the First Nations are neu-
tralized."
52 J. Hunter, "Advancing Aboriginal Claims After Delgamuukw-the Role of the Injunction"
in Litigating Aboriginal Tale, ibid. at 1.3.11 argues that because "it is now apparent that
Aboriginal rights claims will take a very long time to resolve on their merits" "... the intru-
sive nature of an injunction is less satisfactory." But compare Mogerman, ibid. at 1.2.10.
who quotes the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald, ibid. that preserving the
status quo, "as a general rule ... has no merits as such in the face of the alleged violation of
fundamental rights. One of the functions of the Charter is to provide individuals with a
tool to challenge the existing order of things or status quo."
53 See e.g., B.C. (Minister of Forests) v. Adams Lake Indian Band [2000] B.C.J. No. 995
(C.A.)
54 See e.g., House of Sga'nisim, Nisibilada v. Canada, [2000] B.C.J. No. 821(C.A.); Kitkatla
Band v. B.C. (Ministry of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [1999] B.C.J. No. 177
(C.A.).
55 S. Lawrence & P. Macklem, "From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights and
the Crown's Duty to Consult" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 252 at 262.
56 Ibid. at 262.
57 Ibid. at 272. A pre-justification duty to consult was also proposed by Huddart J.A. in Half-
way River First Nations v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) (1999), 178 D.L.R. (4th)
666 (B.C.C.A.).
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Would enforcing the Crown's duty to consult be more disciplined in the
sense that we have suggested, in that the Crown would be more attentive to
the values of human dignity and equality? Good faith consultation with a
view to "negotiat[ing] an agreement specifying the rights of the respective
parties to the territory in question"58 and "translat[ing] Aboriginal interests
adversely affected by proposed Crown action into binding Aboriginal or
treaty rights" 59 would reduce the number and complexity of the issues in the
factual arena, effectively making them matters of law. The issues in dispute
would be limited and summary trials for outstanding issues could be possi-
ble. Such consultation would be disciplined to the extent that the Crown
acts in good faith consistent with its obligation to act honourably towards
Aboriginal peoples. Factual questions about rights would be resolved in a
manner more likely to bring about a reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples
than trial procedures designed primarily for determination of individual
rights. As LaForest J. stated in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia:
On a final note, I wish to emphasize that the best approach in these types of
cases is a process of negotiation and reconciliation that properly considers
the complex and competing interests at stake.6
The phenomenon of the shifting boundaries of law and fact is linked to
the concept of substantive materiality as a pathway to the admission of evi-
dence of social context discussed below.
As the discussion of Aboriginal rights illustrates, it is not sufficient to
look solely at the shifting boundary between law and fact; we should also
pay attention to the interaction between that boundary (as well as other
rules) and social context. Thus Delgamuukw's move to factual questions of
Aboriginal history would have had more adverse consequences for Aborig-
inal peoples if the Supreme Court had not also changed the rules on oral
history. This change created a pathway for Aboriginal peoples to introduce
evidence of their social context-a topic to which we turn to next.
III. PATHWAYS TO SOCIAL CONTEXT
A significant development in the late-twentieth century has been what
we have suggested is a heightened discipline in the form of attention to
social disadvantage through an increasing focus on social context. Rather
than proceeding as if social location-determined in part by experience of,
for instance, racialization, gender-based violence, poverty, colonial history
and disability-is irrelevant to fact finding, decision-makers are becoming
more open to taking social context into account, or at least are grappling
with appropriate responses to such evidence. 6'
58 Supra note 55 at 267.
59 Ibid. at 255.
60 Supra note 9 at para. 207.
61 Hon. Judge Dolores Hansen, "National Judicial Institute Offers Wealth of Resources"
(1994) 3 National 9.
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There are various, overlapping, pathways to such evidence, which we
will illustrate in turn.
a. Materiality-changing the substantive rule.
b. The rules of evidence.
c. Judicial Notice-the evolving concept of impartiality.
d. Openness to expert opinion.
A. Materiality-changing the substantive rule
One of the ways that the law of evidence affects access to social context
evidence is through the requirement that evidence be material. Materiality
is governed by the substantive law-changing the legal rule changes which
evidence is admissible. Sometimes, of course, the substantive issues are
very clear while sometimes the legal question to be answered remains elu-
sive, with consequent effects for the fact-finding process.
For example, what is the substantive test with respect to the interpreta-
tion of contracts? Are the courts trying to determine the subjective intent of
the parties or an objective intent embodied in the words that they have
used? Wigmore suggested that there are four available standards-what do
the words of the contract mean to the community at large (the ordinary or
popular meaning), what do they mean to a special class of person, such as
those engaged in a particular trade (local), what do they mean in terms of
the common intention of the specific parties (mutual) and what do they
mean to an individual (individual). 62 The evidentiary significance of the
answer to Wigmore's questions is obvious, for example, in relation to
whether counsel refers to dictionaries, or calls the contracting parties and
asks them what they intended. The dominant view seems to be that it is the
intent as embodied in the words that matter; that it is primarily those words
which will reveal how the parties "intended" to allocate risks via con-
tract.63 Hence evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties, per-
haps coloured by their social location, is immaterial.
Evidence will shift from immaterial to material or vice versa when the
wording of the rule or the understanding of the meaning of the terms of a
rule is changed. We might say that the principle of materiality has a Janus-
like quality, with a light and a dark side. On the light side it can help mar-
ginalized groups control the operation of stereotypes by making discrimi-
natory social knowledge immaterial or by making egalitarian social
knowledge material.
This light side of materiality is illustrated by the express changes to the
sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code, which incorporated the social
context of Aboriginal peoples into sentencing decisions. Section 718.2(e)
of the Criminal Code provides that "all available sanctions other than
imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be consid-
62 Wigmore, supra note 32 at 186.
63 See R. Sullivan, "Interpreting Contracts: Six Tasks in Search of a Theory" (National Judi-
cial Institute Civil Law Seminar, Contract Law: From Formation to Remedies, Montreal,
17-19 May 2000).
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ered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of
Aboriginal offenders." This section, by making the distinctive situation of
Aboriginal peoples material to sentencing decisions, reflects a commitment
to egalitarian values by its recognition of constraints imposed on Aborigi-
nal peoples by history, poverty and racism. In R. v. Gladue, the Supreme
Court, in interpreting this section, held that the circumstances of Aborigi-
nal offenders "are unique, and different from those of non-Aboriginal
offenders." 64 The Court concluded:
[T]he circumstances of Aboriginal offenders differ from those of the major-
ity because many Aboriginal people are victims of systemic and direct dis-
crimination, many suffer the legacy of dislocation and many are substantially
affected by poor social and economic conditions ... [A]s a result of these
unique systemic and background factors, [Aboriginal peoples are] more
adversely affected by incarceration and less likely to be 'rehabilitated'
thereby, because the internment milieu is often culturally inappropriate and
regrettably discrimination towards them is so often rampant in penal institu-
tions.
65
Judges are to give attention to the "unique background and systemic fac-
tors which may have played a part in bringing the particular aboriginal
offender before the courts." 66 The following circumstances are material:
What understanding of criminal sanctions is held by the community? What is
the nature of the relationship between the offender and his or her commu-
nity? What combination of systemic or background factors contributed to
this particular offender coming before the courts for this particular offence?
How has the offender who is being sentenced been affected by, for example,
substance abuse in the community, or poverty, or overt racism, or family or
community breakdown? Would imprisonment effectively serve to deter or
denounce crime in a sense that would be significant to the offender and com-
munity, or are crime prevention and other goals better achieved through heal-
ing? What sentencing options present themselves in these circumstances?
67
Another instance in which changes to a substantive rule, or to the under-
standing of its meaning, made formerly immaterial evidence material is R.
v. Lavallee.68 The accused, a battered woman, was charged with the murder
of her batterer. She claimed she had acted in self-defence, which requires
that the accused act under a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous
bodily harm. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lavallee, the
requirement of an imminent attack had rendered inadmissible evidence of
the context which might have made the use of force in self-defence reason-
64 R. v. Gladue (1998), 133 C.CC. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.) at para. 37.
65 Ibid. at para. 68.
66 Ibid. at para. 66.
67 Ibid. at para. 80.
68 R. v. Lavallee, [19901 1 S.C.R. 852.
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able.69 In Lavallee, the Supreme Court recognized the limitations of the
imminent danger requirement and reconstructed the concept of the reason-
able person to include the experiences of battered women. Subsequently,
two justices of the Supreme Court provided the following guidelines for
identifying material social context:
To fully accord with the spirit of Lavallee, where the reasonableness of a bat-
tered woman's belief is at issue in a criminal case, a judge and jury should be
made to appreciate that a battered woman's experiences are both individual-
ized, based on her own history and relationships, as well as shared with other
women, within the context of a society and a legal system which has histori-
cally undervalued women's experiences. A judge and jury should be told that
a battered woman's experiences are generally outside the common under-
standing of the average judge and juror, and that they should seek to under-
stand the evidence being presented to them in order to overcome the myths
and stereotypes which we all share. Finally, all of this should be presented in
such a way as to focus on the reasonableness of the woman's actions, without
relying on old or new stereotypes about battered women.
70
On the other hand, materiality also has a dark side. The dark side is that
materiality, in the words of Robert Burns, "serves to assure that the truth
which emerges at trial is a 'legal truth,' determined solely by those aspects
of the case that the law deems of consequence." 7' In addition, as is illus-
trated by Aboriginal cases, what the law deems of consequence may not
reflect the social knowledge and experience of disadvantaged groups. For
instance, labeling Aboriginal rights as sui generis permits doctrines and
concepts to be reshaped and altered without an in-depth analysis of the rea-
sons for the change or the consequences for fundamental rights; it also
changes the boundaries of material evidence, shifting them and making
them fuzzy. Consider, for instance, the concept of fiduciary duty. In non-
Aboriginal cases, it requires the fiduciary "to act selflessly and with undi-
vided loyalty" 72 to the other party. In the law relating to Aboriginal peo-
ples, the Sparrow7 3 version seems to have more to do with setting out how
69 See R. v. Whynot (1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
70 R. v. Malott, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 123 para. 43per L'Heureux-Dube J. and McLachlin J. (as she
was then).
71 R.P. Bums, A Theory of the Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) at 89.
72 P.D. Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in T.G. Loudan, ed., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 1 at 4.
73 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. The Court held that infringements of Aboriginal
rights by the Crown may be justified. For the broad scope of interests that can justify
infringement see Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 165:
"The general principles governing justification laid down in Sparrow, and embellished
by Gladstone, operate with respect to infringements of Aboriginal title. In the wake of
Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of
Aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be traced to the reconcilia-
tion of the ptior occupation of North America by Aboriginal peoples with the assertion
of Crown sovereignty, which entails the recognition that 'distinctive Aboriginal societ-
ies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community'
(R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 73). In my opinion, the development of
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Aboriginal rights can be infringed consistent with the honour of the Crown.
Evidence immaterial under the common law doctrine, such as whether
infringement would benefit a third party, is now material.
The dark side of materiality is also illustrated by the choice of the legal
test for the determination of Aboriginal rights, discussed above, which
turns on factual questions about pre-contact activity, but not current activ-
ity. Under this test, Aboriginal practices invented to adjust to the European
migration are not considered. The effect is to make the impact of the
alleged right on the relationship between members of the society and the
continuing existence of the group immaterial.74 Borrows and Rotman argue
that the test places a displaced focus on Aboriginality and:
[D]raws on inappropriate racialized stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples by
attempting to distil the essence of Aboriginality by reference to their pre-
contact activities. This caricature presupposes that Aboriginal peoples and
their legal systems did not develop in response to European influences, and it
freezes them at the point of contact.
75
A more disciplined choice of material facts would have considered
whether the facts selected reflected stereotypical images of Aboriginal peo-
ples.
76
agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic develop-
ment of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to sup-
port those aims, are the kinds of objectives that are consistent with this purpose and, in
principle, can justify the infringement of Aboriginal title. Whether a particular measure
or government act can be explained by reference to one of those objectives, however, is
ultimately a question of fact that will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis."
74 J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, "The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a
Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9 at 43, discussing R. v. Jack and Charlie (1985), 21
D.L.R. (40) 641 (S.C.C.).
75 Ibid. at 36.
76 Our focus here is on how substantive law focuses attention on some facts while excluding
others, the resulting picture risking the charge of being a stereotypical image. But there is
a rich body of literature on stereotyping Aboriginal people generally. See e.g., R. Kyle,
"Aboriginal Fishing Rights: The Supreme Court of Canada in the Post-Sparrow Era"
(1997) 31 U.B.C. L. Rev. 293 at 310: "... the stereotypical view that Aboriginal people
were historically unconcerned about improving their situation in life"; E. Pasmeny,
"Aboriginal Offenders: Victims of Policing and Society" (1992) 56 Sask. L. Rev. 403 at
408. The author quotes Michael Jackson from, Locking Up Natives in Canada: A Report
of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment and Release (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia, 1988) at 5:
"There is an equation of being drunk and being and and Indian and in prison ... [This
stereotype] reflects a view of [N]ative people as uncivilized and without a coherent
social or moral order ... [I]t prevents us from seeing [NIative people as equals. The fact
that the stereotypical view of [NIative people no longer is reflected in official govern-
ment policy does not negate its power in the popular imagination and its influence in
shaping decisions of the police."
See generally L. Behrendt, "The Eliza Fraser Captivity Narrative: A Tale of the Frontier,
Femininity, and the Legitimization of Colonial Law" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 145 at 163:
"The captivity narratives leave an overwhelmingly negative impression of the abilities of
Aboriginal women. They highlight the stereotype of the moral failings of Aboriginal
women in the domestic realm, painting them as having poor skills as mothers, homemak-
ers, and cooks."
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Choice of material facts can limit access to justice by creating an impos-
sible evidentiary standard-evidence that is difficult or impossible to
obtain is made material. For instance, in R. v. Pamajewon, Chief Justice
Lamer rejected a broad characterization of the Aboriginal claim as a right
to manage the use of reserve lands and characterized the claim as "the right
to participate in, and to regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the res-
ervation." 77 As John Borrows commented on the decision: "The claim is
defeated since Anishinabe gambling, prior to contact, was not done in a
20th century scale. Hardly surprising that this standard of evidence could
not be met. Not many activities in any society, prior to this century, took
place on a 20th century scale."
78
B. The rules of evidence
The framing of the material issue does not, in itself, exhaustively deter-
mine the admissibility of social context evidence. The rules of evidence
themselves, influenced by process-type values, control the openness to
such evidence as well. Thus, the law frames evidence rules which limit
admissibility, for instance, the rule that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible
to interpret a contract unless there is an ambiguity-the "plain meaning"
rule. The substantive test could be the agreement of the parties, as objec-
tively manifested in the words of the contract, as discussed above. The law
of evidence could then take an approach that is open to the indeterminacy
of words and is sceptical of the idea of the objectivity of a decision-maker
uninformed by social context. Thus, extrinsic evidence to assist in applying
the substantive test would be admitted.
The rule of evidence dealing with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence
to assist in the interpretation of contracts is an appropriate candidate for
consideration in this review article. It was the subject of a similar type of
assessment by Wigmore, who stated that the "history of the law of interpre-
tation is the history of a progress from a stiff and superstitious formalism to
a flexible rationalism." 79 In our view, the interpretation of contracts is an
interesting area which can be used as an illustration of the point that it is
increasingly clear that the law of evidence emerges from debates about
competing values or policies. For example, the values of commercial
certainty80 and judicial economy (associated with a positivist judicial ori-
entation to the view that words have a meaning that may be objectively
77 R. v. Pamajewon (1996), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 204 at para. 26, quoted in J. Borrows, "Frozen
Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster" (1998) 22 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 37 at 48.
78 Borrows, ibid. at 54.
79 Supra note 32 at 193.
80 We realize that commercial certainty might be seen more as a substantive value in the law
of contracts rather than an evidentiary value having to do with the process of fact finding.
However, we suggest that the substantive context is likely to influence evidentiary con-
cerns. Where there is a value of certainty in the marketplace, this will form a part of anal-
ysis of both contract and evidence issues. Fact finding about commercial matters,
therefore, is particularly likely to present itself as having to do with determinate rather
than indeterminate matters (words are words, especially written words, rather than vari-
able social constructions). Lord Justice Scrutton reflected concerns about the process of
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determined) may be in tension here with the value of protection of the vul-
nerable (associated with more openness to the indeterminacy of words and
to the importance of context). Such tensions play a role in the development
of substantive contract law, but also in inter-connected issues of evidence
law.
Two quotes may illustrate the kind of tension that we mean. Sir Christo-
pher Staughton has been critical of the openness to evidence of the sur-
rounding circumstances, or background or matrix, to assist in the
interpretation of contracts. Referring, in particular, to Lord Hoffman's
judgment in Investers Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building
Society,81 favouring the admissibility of "absolutely anything which would
have affected the way in which the language of the document would have
been understood by a reasonable man," 82 he said:
It is hard to imagine a ruling more calculated to perpetuate the vast cost of
commercial litigation ... . [TJhe proliferation of inadmissible material with
the label "matrix" [is] a huge waste of money, and of time as well. 83
Compare this focus on commercial and judicial economy with the view
expressed in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Marshall84 about the appropriate approach to the interpretation of treaties
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. The Court noted that there is a
difference between treaties and modern commercial transactions between
two parties of relatively equal bargaining power; 85 it proceeded, then, to
express a positive view of the admission of contextual evidence to help
determine what had been agreed:
[E]ven in the context of a treaty document that purports to contain all the
terms, this Court has made it clear in recent cases that extrinsic evidence of
the historical and cultural context of a treaty may be received even absent
any ambiguity on the face of the treaty. MacKinnon A.C.J.O. laid down the
principle in [R.v.] Taylor and Williams:86
if there is evidence by conduct or otherwise as to how the parties under-
decision-making when he remarked that: "in many commercial matters the English law
and the practice of commercial men are getting wider apart, with the result that commer-
cial business is leaving the courts and is being decided by commercial arbitrators with
infrequent reference to the courts." Hillas and Co. Ltd. v. Arcos Ltd. (1932), 40 Lloyd's
Rep. 307 (C.A.), decision reversed (1932), 147 L.T 503 (H.L.).
81 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v. West Bromwich Building Society, [19981 1 WL.R.
896 (H.L.), a case which incidentally held that subjective evidence of intention should be
excluded.
82 Ibid. at 913.
83 Supra note 32 at 307.
84 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 177 D.L.R. (4 'h) 513 (S.C.C.).
85 Ibid. at para. 4. McLachlin J., in dissent, at para. 78, also indicated that "treaties constitute
a unique type of agreement and attract special principles of interpretation."
86 R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont.C.A.), leave to appeal dis-
missed [1981] 2 S.C.R. xi.
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stood the terms of the treaty, then such understanding and practice is of
assistance in giving content to the term or terms. 
7
Given that Marshall is a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada, it is an important indication of more openness to extrinsic evidence
and, thus, potentially, evidence of social context. It can be argued that Mar-
shall is a case dealing with the interpretation of treaties and that the law
relating to Aboriginal peoples is sui generis. However, on a broader level,
Marshall is a case where explicit (as we would suggest more disciplined)
attention to norms such as equality and the honour of the Crown was linked
to more evidentiary openness to context, including disadvantage in that
context. It is possible that treaty jurisprudence dealing with honour, in the
large sense of the honour of the Crown toward Aboriginal peoples, may
influence the approach to the little honours of everyday commercial agree-
ments. This could happen through an emerging substantive doctrine of
good faith as well as evidentiary openness to evidence of social context to
assist with the interpretation of contracts.
Even on a more bread and butter doctrinal level there is evidence of the
same shift. For instance, some case law suggests that extrinsic evidence
can be admitted with respect to latent (when an attempt is made to apply
the contract to the facts) but not patent (obvious) ambiguities.88 However,
the current trend in the case law seems to be to admit such evidence with
respect to any ambiguity, fueled by academic commentary such as the fol-
lowing:
In the past, however, much turned on whether the ambiguity was latent or
patent. Because courts were reluctant to rewrite contracts for the parties, they
did not permit extrinsic evidence to clear up ambiguities which appeared on
the face of the written document itself. Such ambiguities could be clarified
by resort only to legal principles of construction and not to evidence of the
parties'intentions. This prohibition against the use of parol evidence is erro-
neous and is no longer accepted as a valid principle.
89
Indeed, it has been argued by an American scholar that courts are
increasingly rejecting the plain meaning rule and admitting extrinsic evi-
dence, at least to show that ambiguity exists, or even generally to deter-
mine meaning:
[An increasing number of courts ... have acknowledged that extrinsic evi-
dence relating to context should always be admissible to determine whether
87 Ibid. at 236. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 9 and R. v. Sioui, [199011 S.C.C. 1025.
88 D.R. Bennett, "Recent Developments in the Law of Parol Evidence"(1993) 51 The Advo-
cate 511 at 515.
89 J. Sopinka & S.N. Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases (Toronto: Butterworths,
1974) at 272-73, quoted along with other similar commentary, by The Honourable Mr.
Justice B.I. Cohen, "Parol Evidence Re-Visited: Proof Required" (National Judicial Insti-
tute Civil Law Seminar, Contract Law: From Formation to Remedies, Montreal, 17-19
May 2000).
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ambiguity exists. In so doing, these courts hold that it is not possible to know
whether there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a disputed con-
tract term without examining the surrounding circumstances. In the newest
trend, a few courts have taken a further step and have removed all restraints
upon admission of extrinsic evidence of context. These courts do not pause
to ask if ambiguity is shown; they simply allow the language to be utilized to
discover the real meaning of the contested language. 9
It is tempting to see such developments as modern in some sense-that
somehow the current generation of scholars and jurists have some distinc-
tive insights into the interaction of social location and law, insights which
challenge a more formal conception of the discipline of law. However,
returning to Wigmore suggests that the more things change, the more the
"modern" stays the same:
Once freed from the primitive formalism which views the document as a
self-contained and self-operative formula, we can fully appreciate the mod-
ern principle that the words of a document are never anything but indices to
extrinsic things, and that therefore all the circumstances must be considered
which go to make clear the sense of the words--that is, their association with
things.91
It is, perhaps, distinctive to the beginning of the 21 s' century to connect
this rejection of primitive formalism with attention to social disadvan-
tage-as does the Supreme Court of Canada in Marshall with respect to the
interpretation of Aboriginal treaties-but the above passage from Wigmore
can still be quoted, in a way which makes contemporary sense, in support
of Marshall.
The rules of evidence clearly interact with materiality, as well as with the
fact/law distinction, discussed above. This can be illustrated by combining
the points made about contracts so far, in terms of a spectrum. What would
be the most formalistic approach to the interpretation of contracts? First,
law should fix the meaning of words. Second, the legal test to be applied is
the popular meaning of the words used. Third, the only source to be con-
sulted is the document itself. At the other end of the spectrum, one would
find interpretation viewed as a matter of fact, the test being the subjective
intentions of the parties and openness to hearing their own evidence about
their intentions.
It is tempting to suggest that the former end of the spectrum is the more
"disciplined." In a sense it is, given the greater possibility of reasons being
given for a legal as compared to a factual matter, as well as the certainty
with respect to the sources used. On the other hand, substituting judicial
assumptions about the meaning of words for evidence of what the parties'
meant could be seen as less disciplined if it neglects evidence of the social
90 M.N. Kniffin, "A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for Reality as
Opposed to Virtual Reality" (1995) 74 Oregon L.R. 643 at 643-644.
91 Supra note 32 at 237.
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context affecting meaning. In our view, Marshall suggests that where there
is concern about disadvantage in the social context, and even where the
substantive law remains unchanged, the more disciplined approach is to be
open to extrinsic evidence.
C. Judicial notice-the evolving concept of impartiality
Fact finders may become more exposed to evidence of social context
due to changes in substantive law and in rules about admissibility. Recently
a great deal of attention has also been paid to judicial notice as a means of
drawing on knowledge of social context without the need to call evidence
in individual cases. Judicial notice is a means by which something can be
established without offering evidence.
Judges and jurors necessarily draw on their social knowledge, their
experiences and their background in finding facts. "Human reasoning in
part is a product of one's experience" and that "experience is less what is
produced at trial and more the interaction of what is produced with the
background and experience of the fact finder."92 How disciplined is the
doctrine of judicial notice in ensuring that the operation of such knowledge
is accurate, fair, impartial and egalitarian? There are positive signs that the
doctrine can be used to expand the social context to include an understand-
ing of the adverse effects of racism and gender bias in our society.
In R. v. Gladue, discussed above, a requirement that the accused offer
evidence of social context in every case would have placed an unnecessary
burden on the accused and adversely affected his or her access to justice.
The Court held instead, that "[j]udges may take judicial notice of the broad
systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal people," 93 such as
"widespread racism which has translated into systemic discrimination in
the criminal justice system"' 94 and "the priority given in Aboriginal cultures
to a restorative approach to sentencing." 95 In R. v. Williams, an Aboriginal
accused was charged with robbery and elected to be tried by judge and
jury.9 6 The Supreme Court held that the accused could question potential
jurors to determine whether they possessed prejudice against Aboriginals
which might impair their impartiality. The Court appeared sensitive to the
effect on access to justice of requiring prejudice to be proved in every case
92 R.J. Allen, "Burdens of Proof and Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Dis-
course" (1994) 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 627, quoted in M. MacCrimmon, "Fact Determi-
nation-Common Sense Knowledge, Judicial Notice and Social Science Evidence"
online: International Commentary on Evidence: A Journal of Law and Theory in Elec-
tronic Format http://www.law.gub.ac.uk/ice (date accessed: 27 July 2000) at n. 42 [herein-
after Fact Determination]. See also Boyle, MacCrimmon & Martin, supra note 13 at 23:
"While it is a fundamental principle, consistent with a party-driven adversarial system,
that factual findings should be based on 'the record,' evidence doctrine does recognize
that fact finding is deeply influenced by ... assumptions about the world and human behav-
iour."
93 Gladue, supra note 64 at para. 93.
94 Ibid. at para. 61 (quoting R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 493 at
para. 58).
95 Ibid. at para. 93.
96 Supra note 94.
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in its reference to the doctrine of judicial notice, expressing the view that
"widespread racial prejudice, as a characteristic of a community may ... be
the subject of judicial notice." 97
Judges must remain impartial while taking judicial notice of social con-
text. Thus, the rules regulating the impartiality of judges also, to some
extent, discipline the operation of the social knowledge of the judge such
that the operation of inegalitarian assumptions are controlled. In R. v.
R.D.S., a Black youth was charged with assaulting a White police officer.
98
In acquitting the accused, the trial judge referred to the fact that police
officers had been known to over-react when dealing with non-White
groups. The Crown appealed on the ground that these remarks indicated a
reasonable apprehension of bias. In upholding the acquittal, four justices
held that the standard of impartiality requires judges to incorporate infor-
mation about social context into their decisions and that legitimate social
knowledge is identified by looking at the knowledge of the reasonable per-
son who is an informed and "right-minded" member of the community-a
community which, in Canada, supports the fundamental principles
entrenched in the Constitution by the Charter.99 The statements of two
other justices are consistent with this statement in that they identify "soci-
etal awareness and acknowledgement of the prevalence of racism and gen-
der bias in a particular community" as part of the knowledge of the
reasonable person.
1 °
D. Openness to expert opinion
Another pathway to social context evidence is through expert testimony
(assuming materiality and consistency with the requirements of the opinion
rule). Social science evidence, in particular, has been relied upon to provide
a context in which to understand the behaviour of the witnesses and the
parties. Thus, in R. v. Lavallee,1° 1 evidence of battered women syndrome
was introduced through Dr. Shane to assist the jury in assessing the reason-
ableness of the perceptions of a battered woman who killed her abuser. In
R. v. Marquard,10 2 expert evidence was admitted to explain the reasons
why young victims of sexual assault often do not complain immediately.
Anthropological and historical evidence is often relied upon in Aboriginal
cases. Our objective here is not to address the rule on expert opinion itself,
but to consider how the law disciplines itself through its posture toward
interdisciplinarity.
Since everyone could agree that judges should neither over-use nor over-
value expert evidence about the social sciences, a central issue is the start-
ing perspective. Judges differ in their receptivity to expert opinion. Should
they start from a position of scepticism or of enthusiasm? Should judges
97 Ibid. at para. 54.
98 R. v. R.D.S., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484.
99 Ibid. at para. 46. See also, Fact Determination, supra note 92 at n. 48; C. Boyle et al., "R.
v. R.D.S.: An Editor's Forum" (1998) 10 CJ W.L 159.
100 R.D.S., ibid. at para. 111.
101 R. v. Lavatlee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852
102 R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223.
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see their role as keeping out as much expert evidence about social science
as possible, particularly in jury trials, as it is expensive, time-consuming,
difficult or impossible to assess, may well be biased and incompetent and
often simply duplicates common sense especially where there are unre-
solved disputes within the research area itself? It seems there is a strong
voice for such a sceptical stance in current Canadian literature and case
law. For example, Professor Paciocco has argued that there should be tight
control over expert evidence since the use of bad science can pose a greater
threat than the use of common sense ever did. 1 3 Several of the most con-
tested areas, where we are seeing liberal use of the expression "junk sci-
ence," have to do with violence against women.
Would self-consciousness about the consequences of exclusion of expert
opinion for a fair, egalitarian fact determination process lead to a more pos-
itive view? From this perspective, it seems sensible to assume that the more
we know, the more we might be able to combat inequalities in the world.
Groups who experience inequality, classes of witnesses who risk being
treated as relatively lacking in credibility or whose behaviour seems
implausible or is easily interpreted as consistent with lying-such as chil-
dren, women, and accused persons-use various strategies to try to
enhance their credibility, both legally and socially. They may well turn to
non-legal sources for support in those efforts. As well they may turn to
such sources to provide arguments for changes in substantive law. In other
words, the diverse world in which judging is taking place is a world in
which social location could affect the degree to which it is hoped that the
social sciences can contribute to genuinely open-minded fact determination
and legal policy development.
As we have emphasized, judges and lawyers are increasingly aware of
the importance of taking social location into account. This awareness has
lead to a scepticism about common sense assumptions and an openness to
expert opinion to correct misperceptions about human behaviour. For
instance, in R. v. Chisholm, Hill J. stated:
There exists, it seems a trend toward the admission of expert evidence relat-
ing to the reactive behaviour of individuals who have been sexually victim-
ized as relevant and necessary to the comprehension of the credibility of
sexual assault complainant's testimony. Experts such as [a clinical psycholo-
gist], can make a valuable contribution to an informed understanding of
common patterns of behaviour clinically identified in instances of sexual vic-
timization.1 4
If such an open stance is adopted, it is vital to be clear about the use to
which expert evidence is being put. In Chisholm, Hill J. noted that expert
testimony on the behaviour of people who have been sexually assaulted
103 D.M. Paciocco, "Judicial Notice in Criminal Cases: Potential and Pitfalls" (1997) 40
Crim. Law Q. 35; D.M. Paciocco, "Coping with Expert Evidence About Human Behav-
iour" (1999) 25 Queen's LJ. 305.
104 R. v. Chisholm (1997), 8 C.R. (5th) 21 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 72-73.
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can be relevant and necessary to the comprehension of the credibility of the
testimony of sexual assault complainants. It can assist the trier of fact "by
providing an alternate context for the complainant's conduct--ordinarily
one which serves as an informed check on the rush to a presumed inference
that the behaviour is inconsistent with the occurrence of the assault
alleged."'10
5
This openness and carefulness is not just to facilitate challenge, but also
allows for different levels of scepticism depending on the level of use. The
undoubted dangers of expert evidence, primarily that it may be over-valued
or misused, vary according to what the evidence is addressing. Using it for
diagnostic purposes, for example, that a child was abused or that the
accused is not a sexual offender, justifies a very high level of scrutiny,
while using it to correct stereotypes in relation to credibility is a much less
aggressive use.
The law's stance towards interdisciplinarity is evolving. Historically, the
discipline of law has jealously guarded its borders; insights of other disci-
plines have not readily been incorporated into legal discourse.' 0 6 However,
insights from other disciplines can operate to facilitate open-minded fact
determination. One way this has occurred is when these insights have been
incorporated into a report of a governmental commission. For instance, the
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward,
Looking Back draws on research in other disciplines which shows the exist-
ence of widespread racism against Aboriginal people and documents their
oppression. 0 7 David Stack 10 8 traces the ways that the Report had been
relied upon by courts to make Aboriginal world views relevant to judicial
fact finding in sentencing: t1 9 in decisions as to whether jurors can be chal-
lenged on the basis that a "juror is not indifferent between the Queen and
the accused""10 and in adapting the rules of evidence to reflect Aboriginal
perspectives.I
1
The more disciplined approach to the admissibility of expert opinion
would be to be similarly sceptical about different forms of reasoning and
not to reserve scepticism for information derived from other disciplines.
Rejecting expert evidence via a high standard of validity, while having lit-
tle or no standard of validity for replacement reasoning, could well raise
105 Ibid. at para. 73.
106 Resistance to information from other disciplines can take the form of recasting. Pierre
Schlag describes the recasting by the discipline of law of "intellectual and cultural
insights from other disciplines into forms and uses that accord with the aesthetics of the
judge: the legal brief, the legal opinion, the 1,000 footnote law review article." Schlag,
supra note 6 at 2059, n. 15.
107 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 1: Looking Forward, Looking Back (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1996) [hereinafter Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peo-
ples].
108 D. Stack, "The Impact of RCAP on the Judiciary: Bringing Aboriginal Perspectives into
the Courtroom" (1999) 62 Sask. Law Rev. 471.
109 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 107; Criminal Code, supra note
35, s. 718.2 (e); R. v. Gladue (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
110 Criminal Code, supra note 35, s. 638 (1)(b); Williams, supra note 96.
11 Delgamuukw, supra note 9.
Vol. 20
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
concerns about open-mindedness. 112 The competition for expert evidence
is, of course, common sense, to which we turn in the next section.
IV. THE CONTROL OF RELEVANCE REASONING
Once one is in the realm of a material factual issue, the next inquiry is
whether evidence is relevant.'' 3 Relevant evidence is evidence that has any
tendency to make a material proposition more or less probable. Analyti-
cally, the link between the evidence and proposition is provided by a gener-
alization about the behaviour of people or things. These generalizations, in
most cases, arise from the common sense knowledge and experience of the
fact finder. For instance, if the material proposition is whether John is
intoxicated, the relevance of evidence that John was seen in the Kings
Head Pub depends on generalizations based on common knowledge about
what people do in pubs-that is, people in pubs sometimes drink intoxicat-
ing beverages to excess.1 14 Under the concept of relevance, if the generali-
zation is even slightly likely, the evidence is relevant. Until recently,
although the role of common sense knowledge and reasoning in relevance
assessment was acknowledged, this role was largely unexamined and
uncontrolled. For instance, Stanley Schiff concludes that relevance does
not "depend on any rules of law; it depends solely on the ordinary pro-
cesses of reasoning and the common sense assessment of probabilities
within the framework of the defined issues.""11
5
Recent scholarship, case law and legislation emphasizes the key role of
common sense reasoning about human behaviour in assessments of rele-
vance and suggests that egalitarian fact finding may require legal control of
that reasoning. In our view, a perspective which is explicitly attentive to
public values, such as those in the Charter, and, in particular, to the values
relating to disadvantaged groups, presents one of the most significant chal-
lenges to this area of law. A jurisprudential stance which views law "from
the bottom" 116 brings into focus areas which could be seen as being mar-
ginal but which can be catalysts for change. Given greater acknowledge-
ment of varying perspectives and more effort at self-conscious reasoning
about facts, an argument can be made that an explicit egalitarian perspec-
tive is replacing a stance of value-neutrality as animating, indeed disciplin-
ing, the evolution of the law of evidence.
There is growing awareness by legal decision makers that relevance is
not a value-neutral concept and that the highly intuitive and anarchic pro-
112 Fact Determination, supra note 92.
113 The rules of evidence distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence. Only circumstan-
tial evidence must be found to be relevant in the sense described. However, even with so-
called direct evidence, generalizations about the credibility and reliability of the source
are a necessary part of assessments of probative value.
114 The example is from Boyle, MacCrimmon & Martin, supra note 13 at 48.
115 Stanley A. Schiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process, vot. 1, 4th ed., Master ed. (Scar-
borough, Ont.: Carswell, 1993) at 34.
116 See M.J. Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations"
(1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 at 362.
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cess of fact finding may need to be controlled. Taking an egalitarian per-
spective requires a self-conscious effort to identify when relevance
assessments are based on discriminatory and inegalitarian generalizations.
Therefore, in some cases, a commitment to fundamental values will require
that, as a matter of law, certain inferences be prohibited although some may
see a relevance link based on their common sense knowledge.1 17 Examin-
ing fact determination from the perspective of the disadvantaged shows
that generalizations or stereotypes based on gender, race, sexual orienta-
tion, status, age, etc. have operated in the past to affect access to justice.
Stereotype was described in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) as a misconception whereby a person or, more often, a group
is unfairly portrayed as possessing undesirable traits, or traits which the
group, or at least some of its members, do not possess.' 18 It is not that
harmful stereotypes never are descriptive, but that their operation inflicts
grave social costs and is inconsistent with norms such as human dignity,
autonomy and equality. Such reliance "tends to perpetuate a system in
which legal and social arrangements place 'one' social group defined in
terms of a morally irrelevant characteristic, systematically below
another."' 1 19 What is required, in the words of Alan Mewett, is a "fair
inference-drawing process."'
' 2 0
One area where relevance assessments have been disciplined with a
view to furthering egalitarian fact finding is sexual assault. For instance,
evidence that a complainant had consented to sexual relations in the past
was formerly thought to be relevant to the question whether the complain-
ant consented to sexual relations with the accused via a generalization that
women who have consented to sexual relations in the past are more likely
to have consented to sexual relations or, in other words, that they have a
disposition to consent to sexual relations. The Supreme Court of Canada, in
R. v. Seaboyer, condemned this reasoning on the ground that it draws on
illegitimate myths and stereotypes. 121 We have argued that relevance
grounded on sexual disposition reasoning is inconsistent with human dig-
nity and autonomy. Decisions fundamental to human worth, such as a deci-
sion to engage in sexual relations, "should not be seen as emanating from a
117 See e.g. Fact Determination, supra note 92.
118 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at para. 64. See also Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.CJ. 36, [2000]
S.C.R. 950.
119 M. MacCrimmon, "Fair Trials, Equality Rights and Privacy: The Accused's Right to Dis-
closure of Therapeutic Records" in J.F. Nijboer & J.M. Reijntjes ed., Proceedings of the
First World Conference on New Trends in Criminal Investigation and Evidence (Lelys-
tad: Koninklijke Vermande, 1997) 569 at 577 quoting Cass Sunstein, "On Finding Facts"
in J. Chandler, A.J. Davidson & H. Harootunian eds., Questions of Evidence: Proof
Practice and Persuasion Across the Disciplines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994) at 190.
120 A.W. Mewett, "Secondary Facts, Prejudice and Stereotyping" (1999) 42 Crim L. Q. 319
at 323. See also M. MacCrimmon, "Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1988-89
Term. The Process of Proof: Schematic Constraints" (1990) 1 Supreme Court L.R. (2d)
345.
121 Subsequently, s. 276 of the Criminal Code, supra note 35, made inadmissible evidence of
sexual contact with the accused or any other person for the purpose of implying that, by
reason of the sexual nature of the activity, the complainant consented or is not credible.
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person's character, as if such fundamental decision flowed from a disposi-
tion rather than being the product of individual reflection in terms of time,
circumstances, and current preferences."
' 122
Commitment to the values of individual dignity, privacy and the right to
make a meaningful choice are also key dimensions when, as we view law
"from the bottom," we take the perspective of the accused. Consider
whether the failure of an accused to give evidence is relevant to the issue of
guilt. As a matter of common sense, an accused's failure to testify and to
offer an explanation seems relevant based on the generalization that inno-
cent persons would welcome an opportunity to tell their side of the story.
The existence of other plausible explanations for a failure to testify, such as
a belief that the accused would be a poor witness, do not make the failure
irrelevant. Other explanations for the evidence go to weight, not to the rele-
vance assessment. However, although a failure to testify could be seen to
be relevant, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Noble, held that the
silence of the accused cannot be used in determining whether an accused is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 123 Inferring guilt from silence was
inconsistent with the accused's right to silence and the presumption of
innocence. Sopinka J., for the majority, stated that the right to silence "was
intended to protect the individual against the affront to dignity and privacy
inherent in a practice which enables the prosecution to force the person
charged to supply evidence out of his or her own mouth." 1 24 Inferring guilt
from silence also conflicts with the right to make a meaningful choice
whether or not to testify because "[t]he failure to testify tends to place the
accused in the same position as if he had testified and admitted his
guilt.'
t 25
Disciplined fact determination may require that evidence formerly
deemed irrelevant be labeled relevant or, if formerly deemed relevant but
of low probative value, be assigned higher probative value. As we have
discussed, the test for Aboriginal title requires proof of occupation pre-sov-
ereignty and the continuation of that occupation to present times. In Van
der Peet and Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulties
inherent in demonstrating a continuity between current Aboriginal activi-
ties and the pre-contact practices, customs and traditions of Aboriginal
societies.'2 6 Is evidence of present practices, customs and traditions rele-
vant to show pre-contact occupation? The trial judge in Delgamuukw
thought not. He had held that the oral history evidence of current practices
122 C. Boyle & M. MacCrimmon, "The Constitutionality of Bill C-49: Analyzing Sexual
Assault as if Equality Really Mattered" (1998) 41 Crim. L.Q. 198 at 233.
123 R. v. Noble, [19971 1 S.C.R. 874. The majority did hold, however, at para. 77, that once
the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge may refer to the
silence of the accused as evidence of the absence of an explanation which might raise a
reasonable doubt, or to indicate that the judge need not speculate about possible defences
that might have been offered by the accused had he or she testified. Sopinka J. continues
at Noble, ibid. para. 90 that "these uses may be superfluous." See 6 C.R. (5th) 5 for a crit-
icism by Ronald Delisle.
124 Ibid. at para. 73 quoting R. v. Amway Corp., [1.989] 1 S.C.R. 21 at 40.
125 Noble, ibid. at para. 75.
126 Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para. 83.
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and even of the practices of their immediate ancestors going back 100
years could not demonstrate the requisite continuity between present occu-
pation and past occupation in order to ground a claim for Aboriginal
title.' 2 7 Effectively, he held that there was no logical link between post-
contact and pre-contact practices.
1 28
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that evidence of post-contact prac-
tices, customs and traditions are relevant to prove pre-contact practices,
customs and traditions. In commenting on the trial judge's failure to find a
link between post and pre-contact practices based on oral history, the Court
stated that even "if oral history cannot conclusively establish pre-sover-
eignty (after this decision) occupation of land, it may still be relevant to
demonstrate that current occupation has its origins prior to sovereignty."'1
29
V. CONCLUSION
The discussion of controlling relevance reasoning above illustrates what
we see as the very positive development of attention to the fundamental
value of equality as an emerging habit. It is part of the business of law to
construct facts; at this time, we see lawyers and judges beginning to disci-
pline themselves to ask how that construction can be egalitarian. Rather
than sticking to stock stories, such as the lying woman and the unreliable
child, there is more of a self-conscious effort to tell new stories and cast a
critical eye on the old ones. There is more openness to the idea that there
may be varying perspectives on "facts" and the inferences to be drawn
from them. More explicit attention to reasoning about facts diminishes the
scope for fact finding ungoverned by the rule of law, through increased
accountability flowing from the giving of reasons and appellate control.
Similarly, in other parts of the paper, we have noted openness to evidence
of social context, permitted by changes in substantive law, in evidence doc-
trine, including judicial notice, and a posture of careful interest in informa-
tion from other disciplines. We cast such developments as increased
discipline in the sense of increased attention to fundamental values. How-
ever, pockets of relative anarchy still resist the conclusion that the reason-
ing in those pockets is disciplined. Thus, we see a lack of conscious
attention, a necessary though not sufficient condition for egalitarian legal
reasoning, to the fact/law classification and to the effect of rules of substan-
tive law and evidence on litigants' ability to explain their social location to
decision makers. It is in the area of Aboriginal rights, where the need for
egalitarian fact finding is most pressing and significant, that we see the
greatest current challenge to law to become more disciplined.
127 Ibid. at para. 100.
128 The trial judge held oral history evidence of present and recent occupation "did not dem-
onstrate the requisite continuity between present occupation and past occupation in order
to ground a claim for Aboriginal title." Ibid. at para. 100.
129 Ibid. at para. 101 (emphasis added).
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